This paper evaluates whether microcredit programs such as the popular Grameen Bank reach the relatively poor and vulnerable in two Bangladeshi villages. It uses a unique panel dataset with monthly consumption and income data for 229 households before they received loans. We …nd that while microcredit is successful at reaching the poor, it is less successful at reaching the vulnerable. Our results also suggest that microcredit is unsuccessful at reaching the group most prone to destitution, the vulnerable poor. Our main contribution is to explicitly evaluate the targeting of an anti-poverty intervention using the e¢cient risk-sharing framework in Townsend (1994) .
Introduction
Subsidized credit has a disappointing history of being politically manipulated and diverted from its intended bene…ciaries, the poor. Instead the rich have bene…ted disproportionately from such programs. For instance, 80 percent of the $56 million subsidies provided to Costa Rica's largest bank in 1974 went to large wealthy farmers (Vogel, 1984) . The non-poor were just as likely as the poor to participate in a Indian government subsidized credit scheme in the 1980s (Ravallion and Datt, 1995 ). Yet in recent years, subsidized lending programs such as the Grameen Bank have become "the world's hot idea to reduce poverty (New York Times, 1997)." These "microcredit" schemes provide small loans without collateral to households excluded by the formal …nancial sector in many developing countries (Morduch, 1999) . While there have been numerous attempts to assess the impact of these programs on a variety of outcomes Khandker, 1998a, Morduch, 1998 , and others), there has been little research on how well targeted modern microcredit programs actually are. 1 This paper uses a unique data set from two villages in Northern Bangladesh to test if members of microcredit programs are poorer and more vulnerable than non-members. A household is de…ned as poor if it has low consumption levels, and vulnerable if it is unable to smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic income ‡uctuations. We use consumption and income data for 229 households for twelve months in 1991 ¡ 92 to identify households that are poor and vulnerable. We then check to see which of these households joined a microcredit program by 1995. Since microcredit organizations only just began to give loans in the two villages in 1991 ¡ 92, we can ignore issues of endogeneity for the most part. The three programs in our study, Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Association for Social Advancement (ASA) are the largest microcredit providers in Bangladesh, and among the largest in the world.
We …nd that modern microcredit programs are de…nitely more successful at reaching the poor than their predecessors. The probability that a microcredit member is below the poverty line is substantially higher than that of a randomly picked household in both villages. A 24 percent decrease in monthly consumption at the mean increases the probability of joining a microcredit program by about 6 to 7 percent. In contrast, microcredit is less successful at reaching the vulnerable. We …nd that the vulnerable are more likely to join microcredit programs only in the richer of the two villages. Most crucially, we …nd no evidence that microcredit reaches the households most in need of assistance, the vulnerable poor. Indeed, our results suggest that the vulnerable poor are excluded from microcredit in the poorer village.
Many rural households lack insurance against risks of sickness, ‡oods, crop damage and ‡uctuations in prices. Of these, household-speci…c risks but not aggregate shocks can be insured against at the village level. We think of households that are unable to perfectly insure themselves in the event of household-speci…c shocks as vulnerable. The recent World Development Report uses a similar de…nition: "vulnerability measures...the likelihood that the shock will result in a decline in well-being (World Bank, 2001, p.139)."
In principle, both rich and poor households could be labeled as vulnerable according to our measure. 2 Our data show that poorer households are more vulnerable than the rich, however. Reaching the vulnerable poor is considered to be crucial to any poverty reduction strategy (World Bank, 2001 ). Further, protecting the vulnerable poor is an explicit goal of microcredit practitioners and a means to promote repayment. 3 Grameen explicitly bundles insurance with credit provision: borrowers have access to repeat loans from a disaster fund and a group savings fund when they are hit with an adverse shock. Impact studies emphasize microcredit's role in smoothing consumption (Morduch, 1998 , and Pitt and Khandker, 1998a) .
The main contribution of this paper is to explicitly evaluate the targeting of an anti-poverty intervention using the general equilibrium framework of risk sharing in village economies (Townsend, 1994) . Since the presence of vulnerable households indicates a market or institutional failure, it can be welfare improving to assist the vulnerable, particularly the vulnerable poor. We compute several alternative vulnerability measures to control for measurement error and to allow for di¤erent speci…cations of the basic risk sharing model. Our results on the relationship between vulnerability and microcredit membership are robust to these alternatives. We also compare our vulnerability measure to more commonly used measures of consumption variability, and argue that such measures are inadequate proxies for vulnerability. In contrast to our vulnerability measure, we …nd that rich households have more variable consumption than the poor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two villages and the data. Section 3 derives a measure of vulnerability and describes its estimation. Section 4 reports our …ndings on whether microcredit reaches the poor and vulnerable. Section 5 concludes.
Data
The study uses transactions data collected over 12 months in two villages (called A and B to preserve anonymity) in the district of Rajshahi in northwest Bangladesh. Table 1 reports the distribution of occupations within each village. Village A is primarily agricultural while village B is more diversi…ed in its income sources: only 20 percent of the households in village A but over half the households in village B do not report agriculture or daily labor as their main occupation. Village B has several small shops, a marketplace (haat) that meets twice a week and attracts 200 vendors, and local government o¢ces. All major marketing activities for village A are held in marketplaces outside the village. Both villages grow three rice crops a year. In addition, village A grows betel leaf, a cash crop, and village B has several jointly owned mango orchards (Amin, 1998) .
In 1991, there were 395 and 398 households respectively in the two villages. Of these, 120 households were sampled in each village. Male headed households had a 1 4 chance of being surveyed, while all female headed households were sampled. The lack of complete data for a few households brought the number of units in our sample down to 112 for village A and 117 for village B. Households were followed for 12 rounds and data on income, expenditure, asset transactions, time use, loans and gifts were collected at each round. 4 Each round corresponds roughly to a calendar month, with rounds 4 Resident research teams of 2 male and 2 female interviewers who were recent university 3 starting in September 1991 for village A and October 1991 for village B. Two consumption measures were created for each of the sampled households over the 12 months: food consumption and all (non-durable) consumption. Food consumption includes consumption from own production of wheat and rice, purchased wheat and rice, other food purchases (e.g. vegetables and pulses), other food consumption from own produce, net meals received as wages or gifts. All consumption adds expenditure on services and other non-durable purchases (e.g. tobacco and medicines). Measures of household income and revenue were also created. 5 All income includes net pro…ts from own crop production, net wages earned, net pro…ts from trading, self employment and business activities, and rent. Revenue comprises gross pro…ts and wages earned. Neither the all income measure nor the revenue measure include net borrowing and saving or net gifts received. Each of these are assumed to be smoothing devices used to augment consumption when incomes are low or to put aside resources when incomes are high. Field observation and the detailed transactions data indicate that zero nominal interest loans were common within both villages, and gift exchange in the form of meals or food was widespread. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the two villages. The unit of observation is a household. Village B is wealthier than village A: adult equivalent monthly consumption, income, and revenues are all higher in B. The mean adult equivalent monthly income is 429 taka (approximately $11) in village A and 537 taka in village B (approximately $14 using the 1992 exchange rate of $1 = 38 taka). The daily agricultural wage in both villages in 1991 ¡ 92 was 20 taka plus two meals, valued at about 7 taka each. So a day's agricultural work was worth less than $1. Since the coe¢cient of variation of consumption is lower than that of income or revenues for both villages, there appears to be some risk sharing by households. There is considerable idiosyncratic (and hence diversi…able) risk in this economy: incomes and revenue do not comove across households.
graduates lived in each village between June 1991 and November 1992. The principal investigator spent approximately one week every month in the villages to supervise and participate in data collection. 5 Consumption, income and revenue are in per adult equivalent terms throughout the paper. The following age-sex weights were used: 1:0 for adult males, 0:9 for adult females, 0:94 for males aged 13¡18, 0:83 for females aged 13¡18, 0:67 for children aged 7¡12, 0:52 for children aged 4 ¡ 6; 0:32 for toddlers aged 1 ¡ 3; and 0:05 for infants. These weights are the same as those used by Townsend (1994) which are based on a south Indian dietary survey. Wodon (1997) calculates a poverty line of 425 taka monthly per capita consumption for Rajshahi for 1991¡92 using the cost of basic needs method. 6 According to his estimates, 62 percent of rural Rajshahi and 47 percent of rural Bangladesh is below the poverty line. Village A is slightly poorer than the average Rajshahi village: 68 percent of the sampled households are below the poverty line. On the other hand, village B is slightly richer than the average Rajshahi village but still poor relative to the national average: 54 percent of its sampled households are below the poverty line. 7 A resurvey of both these villages was carried out in 1995. In particular, we have information on the number of households (or their splits) that had joined Grameen, BRAC and ASA by 1995.
8 This is the unique feature of the data that we exploit in our analysis. In 1991 ¡ 92, when the …rst survey was conducted, Grameen Bank had only begun to establish their presence in the two villages. In village A, 5 sampled households took their …rst loans from Grameen before the end of the survey in 1992, of which 2 took loans in the last two months of the survey. In village B, 14 sampled households took Grameen loans before the end of the survey in 1992, of which 4 households took loans in the last quarter of the survey. 9 By 1995, Grameen, BRAC and ASA had …rmly established their loan program in these villages. Throughout this paper, consumption and income data (and therefore our measures of vulnerability) are based on the 1991 ¡ 92 data. Microcredit membership data, on the other hand, are derived from the 1995 resurvey. A household's average consumption level and vulnerability may of course change between 1991 ¡ 92 and the year just before it joined a microcredit program, but we have no data for the intervening period to control for this possibility. However, once a microcredit program begins lending in an area it expands quickly and other microcredit programs follow soon after. So it is likely that households that joined microcredit programs did so soon after the 1991 ¡ 92 6 The poverty line was set by computing the (district speci…c) cost of a food basket that enabled households to meet the normative nutritional requirement of 2:5 kilocalories, and adding to this an estimated allowance for non-food consumption. 7 The percentages of households below the poverty line have been weighted to re ‡ect the oversampling of female-headed households. 8 Households that split between 1992 and 1995 were treated as a single unit. Field observations suggest that split households maintain very close social and economic ties, and appear to act as a single large unit. 9 For those households that had already joined Grameen before the end of the survey our estimates of poverty and vulnerability levels may be biased by the loans taken from Grameen. We discuss the likely direction of such bias, wherever applicable, in Section 4. data was collected. Table 3 summarizes the village composition in terms of several household categories (landlessness, female headship, education level of the household head). 10 In addition, the number of households with at least one microcredit member by 1995 is reported. About one third of all sampled households in each village had joined a microcredit program by this time. Grameen membership had risen to 10 sampled households in village A and 17 sampled households in village B; and total microcredit membership was 38 sampled households in each village.
Microcredit loan use is typically quite fungible. So even though the loans are sometimes given for production, they can be diverted for consumption smoothing. Todd (1996) describes how paddy husking and the purchase of cows are commonly reported uses of Grameen loans, but in practice loans are often used to lease land and repay other loans (a consumption smoothing activity).
Measuring vulnerability
Under commonly made assumptions (separability of consumption and leisure, common rates of time preference, additively separable preferences over time) e¢cient risk sharing within a village implies that household consumption should move only with aggregate consumption and not with household income (Deaton, 1997, pages 372 ¡ 383; and Townsend, 1994). We measure vulnerability based on this risk sharing test. Instead of looking at speci…c smoothing mechanisms (such as loans, gifts, savings or asset sales), vulnerability is derived from household outcomes (consumption and income). In this Section we describe how we estimate a baseline vulnerability measure for each household and propose alternative vulnerability measures to study its robustness. We also report on the correlation of vulnerability with poverty and with measures of the variability of consumption.
Risk Sharing
A key feature of e¢cient risk sharing within the village is that changes in log marginal utility of consumption must be equated across households at each date and state. Suppose households have a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function:
where c h t denotes consumption for household h at time t; n h t is the (age-sex adjusted) number of male adult equivalents in the household at time t, ³ h t is a preference shock and ¾ is the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion. E¢cient risk sharing then implies the following for each household h:
where ¢x t´xt ¡ x t¡1 for any variable x t , and · t is the …rst di¤erence in logarithms of the appropriately discounted multiplier associated with the aggregate resource constraint. So consumption across agents should comove (modulo variations due to preference shocks), and changes in a household's consumption should not be a¤ected by changes in that household's income. Equation (1) constitutes the basis of our estimation strategy. If full risksharing is in place and preference shocks can be treated as mean zero error terms that are uncorrelated with changes in income and with time dummies, then changes in per-adult-equivalent consumption over time should comove across households. Household consumption should only be a¤ected by aggregate ‡uctuations in the village, and not by idiosyncratic shocks to the household's own income or resources. Our estimation strategy focuses on identifying individual households within each village that are vulnerable to idiosyncratic risk.
So far we have implicitly assumed that the household utility stays the same if one doubles both the total consumption in the household and the number of adult equivalents. But a bigger household may be more e¢cient. First di¤erencing consumption will eliminate economies of scale that are …xed through time, however. Only 3 households in village A and 2 in village B change composition during the 12 months of the sample, so we can safely ignore household economies of scale. 
Estimation
We estimate a linear regression model based on equation (1) (1), which is proportional to a measure of the aggregate resource constraint at date t. The error term "
The …rst assumption on heteroskedasticity is motivated by the results of several tests (such as the White general test and the Glesjer test based on the regression of the squared residuals on several household variables). Intuitively, it seems reasonable to allow the variance of the residuals to vary across households, since they have very di¤erent sizes, landholdings, consumption and income levels. The other assumptions are quite standard. We have tested for the presence of contemporaneous correlation across households using a variety of methods, and we …nd very little evidence, if any, of such correlation. We estimate (2) via FGLS, postulating that the individual household variance depends on several observable characteristics (such as landholdings or household size) in the following way:
The regression equation (2) has been estimated numerous times in the literature on e¢cient risk sharing, for the special case in which ® h = ® for 8 all h. Under the null hypothesis of full risk sharing in the village as a whole, equation (1) implies that ® must be equal to zero. A signi…cantly positive estimated coe¢cient b ® implies that the full risk-sharing hypothesis can be rejected for the village as a whole. Both villages in our dataset fail the full risk sharing test. For village A, b ® = 0:0366 (with a p-value of 0:005) and for village B, b ® = 0:0299 (with a p-value of 0:019). For this paper we are interested in identifying speci…c households for which the implications of full risk-sharing models are rejected. So we estimate a separate ® h parameter for each household h. The baseline regression (2) is estimated separately for each village. The distribution of the estimates b ® h are depicted in Figure 1 . Nineteen households in village A and 18 in village B had positive and signi…cant b ® h using a 10% statistical signi…cance level.
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The mean of the b ® h estimates is 0:11 in village A and 0:19 in village B. The theoretical framework only o¤ers a test of whether full risk sharing holds for a given household. To interpret the size of a signi…cantly positive vulnerability coe¢cient, we consider autarky with limited savings possibilities as an alternative to the full risk sharing model. Under this alternative, ® h would be positive. As the household moves from full risk sharing to autarky, its ® h parameter will increase. 12 Our baseline measure of vulnerability therefore is the estimated b ® h . One may be concerned that the observed income ‡uctuations ¢e y h t may just re ‡ect seasonal variations that a¤ect the village as a whole (such as planting and harvest, rainy and dry seasons), and not household-speci…c shocks. But since such village-wide shocks are controlled for by the month dummy in the baseline regression (2), our b ® h estimates detect responses of household consumption to household-speci…c shocks controlling for villagewide ‡uctuations. Further, there is substantial household speci…c (and hence insurable) risk in these economies. The deviations of household income from the village average are largely uncorrelated across households.
So far we have restricted all agents to have the same coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion ¾. Our vulnerability estimates from regression (2) may be biased as a consequence. In particular, our b ® h estimates may simply re ‡ect individual di¤erences in the attitude towards risk: a less risk averse household may be associated with a higher b ® h , whereas a more risk averse household may exhibit a lower b ® h . If some agents were more or less risk averse than others, with ¾ h denoting household h's degree of risk aversion, then equation (1) would become (ignoring the preference shock term for simplicity):
Suppose the true model were equation (3) but we estimate regression (2) instead. Then b Á t is an estimate of ¡º· t (where º = 1 N P h º h and º h´1 ¾ h ), and we have to evaluate the possibility that omitting the term (º h ¡ º) · t may bias our b ® h estimates. Suppose we assume that º h is uncorrelated with ¢e y h t , since the latter re ‡ects idiosyncratic shocks that hit household h which should be independent of that household's degree of risk aversion. That implies our b ® h estimates from regression (2) will be biased only if there is a non zero correlation between ¢e y h t and · t , i.e. between changes in individual income and changes in the aggregate resource constraint over time. We proxy for · t using the change in aggregate consumption. In the data, the correlation between changes in household income and changes in aggregate consumption is negligible and statistically insigni…cant for both villages (0:009 in village A and ¡0:025 in village B). Therefore di¤erences in risk aversion will not bias our vulnerability estimates.
Robustness
We estimate several alternatives to the baseline vulnerability measure for each household:
1. Truncated. The …rst round of data collected in both villages is more susceptible to measurement error than subsequent rounds because the enumerators did not have a starting inventory of household grain and foodstu¤ to go by. Therefore we estimate ® h parameters excluding the …rst round of data.
Sickness shocks can reduce a household's desire to consume, for instance, and can be correlated with income shocks.
3. Female Headship. The baseline regression equation (2) assumes common risk aversion. While we do not have the degrees of freedom necessary to directly estimate a household speci…c risk aversion coe¢cient, it is possible to allow the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion to vary across groups. Female headship is associated with higher vulnerability in regressions of our baseline vulnerability measure on household characteristics. 13 Therefore, it may be the case that female headed households are more risk averse than male headed households. A version of risk sharing implication (1) allowing for the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion to di¤er across female and male headed households is
where F is a Household Dummy that is equal to one if household h is a female headed and zero otherwise. Therefore assuming, as before, that preference shocks can be treated as mean zero error terms that are uncorrelated with the other regressor, we also estimate the following version of the model:
Thus we estimate a Á t parameter for male headed households and a Á t + Á 1t parameter for female headed households to re ‡ect possible di¤erences in risk aversion between the two.
4. Common Components. Measurement error that is common to consumption and income would bias our vulnerability estimate in equation (2) . There are components of consumption (such as net meals received as wages and own produce consumed) that are also included as income. So we exclude these common components from the measure of income in our estimation of household vulnerability. 13 Vulnerability is more elusive than poverty. The adjusted R 2 from regressions of vulnerability on household characteristics were much lower than the adjusted R 2 from regressions of average household all consumption on household characteristics. Further, only female headship in the pooled regression and in the village B regression was signi…cantly negative, by itself and with controls for other household characteristics.
5. Stronger De…nition. Our baseline vulnerability measure identi…es a household as vulnerable even if it achieves the "average" level of vulnerability for the village as a whole. A stronger de…nition of vulnerability would only consider those households vulnerable who achieve less insurance than the average in the village. So we construct the following measure from the baseline: vulnerability is
6. CRRA utility. To check if our measure of vulnerability is robust to the choice of utility function, we use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility speci…cation,
to derive the counterpart to equation (1):
We estimate the following regression:
where e R h t represents per-adult-equivalent revenues for household h at month t. We use revenues instead of income because the latter can sometimes take negative values, while the former cannot. Revenues proxy for idiosyncratic risk. The distribution of the b ® h estimates are shown in Figure 1 
In what follows, we will present results …rst using the baseline measure, and then using the alternative measures as a cross-check.
Vulnerability, Variability and Poverty
As one would perhaps expect, poorer households tend to be more vulnerable than richer households in our data. Vulnerability is signi…cantly negatively correlated with consumption using the pooled data and in village B ( Table 5) . This …nding is stable across all the alternative vulnerability measures, except for CRRA measure where the correlation is negative but not signi…cant. The same pattern emerges from a comparison of the average vulnerability of households below the poverty line with those above the poverty line in Table 6 . Households below the poverty line have signi…cantly higher average vulnerability than those above the poverty line for the baseline and half the alternative vulnerability measures using the pooled data, and for the baseline and all but one of the alternative vulnerability measures in village B: 14 Our measure of vulnerability is quite distinct from measures of consumption variability, such as the coe¢cient of variation (CV) of consumption or the variance of log consumption. 15 The baseline and most alternative measures of vulnerability are not signi…cantly correlated with either of the two measures of consumption variability ( Table 5) . Though poor households tend to be more vulnerable than the rich, rich households have more variable consumption than the poor. Household consumption is positively correlated with the CV of consumption using the pooled data and in village A for food consumption ( Table 5) . Households below the poverty line have a signi…cantly lower CV of consumption than those above the poverty line in each village ( Table 6 ). Households below the poverty line also have a signi…cantly lower variance of log consumption than households above the poverty line using the pooled data ( Table 6 ). In addition, while consumption variability may just capture di¤erences in risk aversion across households, our vulnerability measure is unbiased even when some households are more risk averse than others, provided the degree of risk aversion is uncorrelated with shocks to household income (Section 3.2). Consequently for the rest of the paper we will be concerned with vulnerability and not with consumption variability.
Results
In this Section we test if households that joined microcredit programs by 1995 were poorer and more vulnerable in 1991 ¡ 92 than households that did not join microcredit programs by 1995: We do this by comparing average consumption and average vulnerability of members with non-members, testing whether the distribution of consumption and vulnerability of members …rst order stochastically dominates that of non-members, and by conducting probit regressions of microcredit membership on consumption, vulnerability and household characteristics.
Poverty
There is clear evidence that households that joined microcredit programs by 1995 were poorer in 1991 ¡ 92 than those that did not join. The Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) of average monthly consumption and income for microcredit members and non-members are shown in Figure 2 . In both villages, and more so in village B, the distribution for non-members is shifted to the right. The average monthly consumption for members is signi…cantly lower than that of non-members using the pooled data, and in both villages separately ( Table 6 ). In village A average monthly all consumption is 36 taka (approximately $1) lower for members, which is10 percent of the village average monthly consumption. In village B average monthly all consumption is 88 taka (approximately $2) lower for members, which is 20 percent of the village average monthly consumption. Correlations between average monthly consumption and membership are also signi…cantly negative using the pooled data and in village B and negative but barely insigni…cant in village A ( Table 5) .
In addition to just looking at speci…c moments of the distribution of consumption of members and non-members, we also use a non parametric test to check if the distribution of average monthly consumption for nonmembers …rst order dominates that for members. This test is based on Anderson (1996) and is described in more detail in the appendix. The results in Table 3 show that the distribution of consumption for non-members signi…cantly …rst order stochastically dominates the distribution for members using the pooled data and in village B: The test of …rst order stochastic dominance goes in the same direction, but is barely insigni…cant, in village A. Thus we have a strong indication that members are poorer than nonmembers, since …rst order stochastic dominance implies both second and third order dominance.
Another way of evaluating the success of microcredit programs in reaching the poor is by using the poverty line. The proportion of microcredit members below the poverty line is 79 percent in village A and 74 percent in village B, which is signi…cantly higher than the proportion of non-members below the poverty line in both villages ( Table 6 ). The proportion of microcredit members below the poverty line is also higher than the village averages, the Rajshahi district average and the national average of 47 percent (see Section 2). Therefore, the probability that a household was below the poverty line when it received a loan is substantially higher than the probability of a randomly picked Bangladeshi household being below the poverty line.
A probit regression in table 7 shows that a 100 taka or 24 percent decrease in monthly consumption at the mean gives a household a 6 or 7 percent higher probability of receiving a loan on average. This is statistically signi…cant using the pooled data and in village B conditional on vulnerability (column 4) and controlling for other household characteristics (column 6). This is signi…cant for village A controlling for vulnerability (column 4) and signi…cant at the 11% level controlling for other household characteristics (column 6).
Since one-third of the households that eventually became microcredit members in village B joined before the end of the twelve rounds of data collection in 1992, there is the possibility that the loans they received may have a¤ected the consumption of those households, and thus could bias our results. Provided loans have a non-negative impact on household consumption, however, such a bias will only strengthen our …nding that microcredit reaches the poor. Our results may therefore underestimate microcredit's e¤ectiveness at reaching the poor in village B:
Finally notice that having more arable land is not signi…cantly associated with a lower probability of joining a microcredit program ( Table 7 column 3). So that though microcredit does reach the consumption-poor there is no evidence that it reaches the relatively landless. 16 
Vulnerability
There is weak evidence that households that joined microcredit programs by 1995 were more vulnerable in 1991 ¡ 92 than those that did not join. The Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) of vulnerability for microcredit members and non-members are shown in Figure 2 . Notice that though members appear to be more vulnerable in village B; non-members appear to be more vulnerable in village A: The average vulnerability of members is significantly higher than that of non-members in village B but not in the pooled data ( Table 6 ). This is robust to all alternative vulnerability measures except for the Common measure, where it is barely insigni…cant. Correlations between vulnerability and membership are also signi…cantly negative only in village B but not in the pooled data ( Table 5) , and this …nding is robust to alternative vulnerability measures. The results from the non-parametric tests in Table 4 show that the distribution of vulnerability for members significantly …rst order stochastically dominates the distribution for non-members using the pooled data and in village B.
The probit regression in table 7 yields the same pattern across the two villages (column 1) and again it is robust to most alternative vulnerability measures. Raising vulnerability by 0:2 at the mean raises the probability of being a microcredit member by about 3 percent in village B. Interestingly, vulnerability does not signi…cantly increase a household's probability of joining if we control for poverty (column 4) and other household characteristics (column 6). This gives a potential explanation for the di¤erences across villages: since village B is richer than village A; vulnerable households may be more likely to join in village B only because they are not as poor.
This result is subject to the following caveat. It seems reasonable to suppose that microcredit membership either decreases a household's vulnerability or leaves it unaltered. Since a third of the microcredit members in village B joined Grameen before the end of the twelve rounds of data collection in 1992, these households may appear less vulnerable than they were before joining Grameen. Consequently we may underestimate microcredit's e¤ectiveness at reaching the vulnerable in village B.
Interaction
Finally, we wish to check if vulnerable households below the poverty line have a higher probability of joining microcredit programs than vulnerable households above the poverty line. We are particularly interested in this since the vulnerable poor are those that would likely gain the most from gaining access to smoothing devices, thus avoiding possible destitution. Therefore, we introduce an interaction term in the probit regression in Table 7 (column 5). The coe¢cient on the interaction term is insigni…cant using the pooled data and in village B. But interestingly, the interaction has a signi…cantly negative coe¢cient in village A (and the coe¢cient remains signi…cantly negative when we replace the baseline vulnerability measure with the alternative vulnerability measures that use truncated data, control for medical expenses and exclude common components). For households that are below the poverty line in village A, raising vulnerability by 0:1 or 9 percent at the mean lowers the probability of joining a microcredit program by about 2:3 percent, and this is signi…cant at the 10% level.
So microcredit does not reach the vulnerable poor in the relatively richer village B, and appears to exclude the vulnerable poor in the poorer village A: In other words, poor households that do join tend to have better access to insurance and smoothing devices than those who do not. The vulnerable poor may either choose not to join or they may be excluded by the microcredit program. There is some anecdotal evidence consistent with the latter. For instance, a bank o¢cer told Todd (1996, p.173) that he was looking for borrowers that were "not hopeless." This suggests that subsidized loans may not be the appropriate strategy to reach the vulnerable poor, because of their potentially higher default risk.
Microcredit's success at reaching the poor is robust to introducing the interaction term. Households below the poverty line have a 19 percent higher chance of joining a microcredit program using the pooled data ( Table 7 , column 5). This coe¢cient remains signi…cantly positive when we use alternative vulnerability measures instead of the baseline.
Conclusions
This paper uses panel data from two Bangladeshi villages to test if microcredit reaches the poor and vulnerable. This analysis is possible due to the convenient timing of data collection. Households were extensively surveyed in 1991 ¡ 92, when microcredit programs had only a small presence in the study villages. Households were subsequently resurveyed in 1995 by which time microcredit programs had …rmly established themselves.
This paper studies the interaction between microcredit selection and the vulnerability of rural households. Vulnerability refers to the inability of households to insure against idiosyncratic risks, and it is distinct from measures of consumption variability. It provides an example of how an antipoverty program which is successful at reaching the poor may exclude the those most in need of assistance, the vulnerable poor. The forces that make some poor households vulnerable may also make them greater risks for microcredit providers, however. This may explain why microcredit programs are unsuccessful at reaching the vulnerable poor in these villages, and suggests that subsidized credit may have limits as an anti-poverty strategy. 17 Our vulnerability estimates for instance are based on monthly data collected over 12 months. It would be interesting to see if estimates of household vulnerabilty are stable from year to year, or if some households are more vulnerable to annual income shocks than to monthly shocks. It would also be useful to know if microcredit's success at reaching the vulnerable poor depends on village characteristics, such as average village poverty or vulnerability. How does the process of forming borrower groups a¤ect the likelihood that the vulnerable poor join microcredit programs? Do relatively poor and vulnerable households had higher default rates after they join microcredit programs? We leave these questions for future research with more detailed data sets.
6 Appendix: First Order Stochastic Dominance tests
Suppose the cumulative distribution function of consumption for N (for nonmembers) and M (for members) is given by F N (c) and F M (c) respectively. Let C be the range of consumption for both these distributions First order stochastic dominance of distribution N over M is equivalent to the condition:
Anderson's (1996) test of …rst order stochastic dominance is quite straightforward to implement. The idea is to partition the combined sample for N and M into k equal intervals and compute the empirical frequencies of the N and M samples in each interval: for example, p (7) translates into the following hypothesis test:
In particular, …rst order dominance of distribution N over M requires that no element of the vector I f (p N ¡ p M ) be signi…cantly greater than zero, while at least one element is signi…cantly negative. The test is symmetric, so …rst order dominance of distribution M over N requires that no element of the vector I f (p N ¡ p M ) be signi…cantly negative, while at least one element is signi…cantly positive. Finally, the test statistic I f (p N ¡p M ) is asymptotically distributed as a N (0; I f V I 0 f ) under the null hypothesis, where V can be estimated using the empirical frequencies p of the combined sample. See Anderson (1996) for the details. The columns report the differences between the CDF of Consumption for Members and Non-members, at several points. Under the null hypothesis that the two samples come from the same distribution, each term is distributed as a Student's t with (here) 9 degrees of freedom.The t-statistics are in parentheses. The distribution for Members first order dominates that for Non-members if no term is significantly greater than zero while at least one is significantly negative. Likewise, dominance of Non-members over Members requires than no term be significantly negative while at least one is significantly positive. * Statistically significant at 10% level. **Statistically significant at 5% level. ***Statistically significant at 1% level. The columns report the differences between the CDF of Vulnerability for Members and Non-members, at several points. Under the null hypothesis that the two samples come from the same distribution, each term is distributed as a Student's t with (here) 9 degrees of freedom.The t-statistics are in parentheses. The distribution for Members first order dominates that for Non-members if no term is significantly greater than zero while at least one is significantly negative. Likewise, dominance of Non-members over Members requires than no term be significantly negative while at least one is significantly positive. * Statistically significant at 10% level. **Statistically significant at 5% level. ***Statistically significant at 1% level. Avg. Cons. 
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